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Can Foreign Aid Save Africa? 
By William Easterly (NYU), December 2005
Gordon Brown, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer is compassionate about the 
first tragedy of Africa’s poor: such as the millions of children dying from prevent-
able diseases. He called for a doubling of foreign aid in January 2005. He offered 
hope by pointing out how easy it is to do good. Medicine that would prevent half 
of all malaria deaths costs only 12 cents per dose. A bed net to prevent malaria 
costs only $4. Spending just $3 on each new mother would prevent 5 million 
child deaths over the next ten years. 
The year 2005 was the year that the West tried harder than ever to save Africa.1 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair called at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos in January 2005 for “a big, big push forward” in Africa to end poverty, 
financed by an increase in foreign aid.2 Tony Blair commissioned a Report 
on Africa, which released its findings in March 2005, likewise calling for a 
“big push.” Gordon Brown and Tony Blair put the cause of ending poverty in 
Africa at the top of the agenda of the G-8 Summit in Scotland in July 2005. 
Rock celebrity Bob Geldof assembled well-known bands for “Live 8” concerts 
on July 2, 2005 in nine cities around the world to lobby the G-8 leaders to 
“Make Poverty History” in Africa. 
In July 2005, the G-8 agreed to double foreign aid to Africa, from $25 
billion a year to $50 billion to finance the big push, as well as to forgive the 
African aid loans contracted during previous attempts at a “big push.” Africa 
was already the most aid-intensive region in the world before the efforts of 
2005. In September 2005, the world’s leaders gathered at the United Nations 
to further discuss progress on ending poverty in Africa.
This aid came about because Africa’s tragedy has been well known for a while. 
Sub-Saharan Africa contains 11 percent of the world’s population, but produces 
only 1 percent of the world’s GDP. In the median African nation, 43 percent 
of the population lives on less than a dollar per day (adjusted for purchas-
ing power). Of the World Food Programme’s list of 23 countries with more 
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than 35 percent of the population malnourished, 17 of the 23 are in Africa.3 
AIDS and malaria kill the bulk of their victims in Africa. There are the long 
and brutal civil wars in Sudan, Angola, and Chad, not to mention Rwanda’s 
genocide and the recent carnage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(registering the world’s highest war casualties since World War II).  Related to 
war, seven of the eight recent cases of total societal breakdown into anarchy 
(known in the literature as state failure) in the world were in Africa: Angola, 
Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zaire/Congo (the other 
was Afghanistan).4
Life expectancy is another indicator that highlights Africa’s tragedy, thanks to 
the double blow of high infant mortality and high adult mortality from AIDS. It 
is possible to pick a threshold for life expectancy (58 years) in which every African 
country is below that threshold and only a handful of other very dysfunctional 
societies elsewhere (see the following map).
The response of the West to Africa’s tragedy has been constant throughout the 
years, from economist Walt Rostow and John F. Kennedy in 1960 to economist 
Jeffrey Sachs and Tony Blair in 2005: give more aid. Walt Rostow, motivated by 
acceleration of Cold War, called for doubling foreign aid in 1960; World Bank 
President McNamara called for doubling aid in 1973: the World Bank again called 
for doubling aid with end of Cold War in 1990. World Bank President Wolfensohn 
called for doubling aid with beginning of terrorist war in 2001. As just noted, G-8 
Summit in July 2005 agreed to double aid to Africa. Aid to Africa did indeed rise 
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steadily throughout this period (tripling as a percent of African GDP from 1970s 
to 1990s), but African growth remained stuck at zero percent per capita.
Another attempt to transfer resources to Africa is in the form of debt relief. 
Beginning in 1979, Africa had Paris Club reschedulings of debt, conversion of 
loans into grants, and replacing non-concessional loans with concessional loans. 
The debt relief effort intensified in recent years from the 1996 Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative to 1999 Enhanced HIPC to 100% Debt Can-
cellation at this year’s IMF and World Bank meetings. Ironically, debt forgiveness 
was necessary because aid agencies’ zero-interest, 10 year grace period, 40 year 
maturity aid loans did not generate enough to pay them back. The record shows 
that debt forgiveness has already been tried and it did not bring growth to Africa 
or even sufficient relief from debt.
Brown, Blair, and Sachs are silent about this second tragedy of Africa’s poor. This 
is the tragedy in which the West has spent $568 billion on foreign aid to Africa 
over the past four decades and has still not managed to get 12-cent medicines to 
children to prevent half of all malaria deaths; The West has spent $568 billion 
on foreign aid to Africa and still has not gotten $4 bed nets to people to prevent 
malaria. The West has spent $568 billion on foreign aid to Africa and still has 
not got around to spending the $3 per new mother that would prevent millions 
of child deaths.
The key problem behind the second tragedy is that aid agencies and rich coun-
try politicians are not accountable to the poor for the results of their aid efforts: 
there is nobody motivated and responsible for delivering 12-cent medicines to 
poor malaria victims. Foreign aid agencies satisfy the demands of the rich public 
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Figure 2: Aid and growth in Africa (10-year moving averages) 
17.00%
15.00%
13.00%
11.00%
9.00%
7.00%
5.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%
-0.50%
Ai
d 
as
 p
er
ce
nt
 o
f G
DP
Grow
th per capitaid as percent of GDP
r capita growth
for feel-good moments, the feeling that “something is being done” about the first 
tragedy. The emphasis on aid quality lets aid agencies off the hook for actually 
delivering results.
There was a major incentive problem that contributed to the second tragedy. 
If all aid agencies and rich country politicians are collectively responsible for an 
objective, then individual agency’s or politician’s accountability for making progress 
towards the objective is non-existent. A very general objective (such as “saving 
Africa”) weakens accountability because it is hard to disentangle the effect of aid 
from other factors.
Economists’ theoretical models and empirical studies have very often guided the 
various efforts to have Western assistance rescue Africa. How has this literature 
fared in practice and how has it evolved throughout the years? What is the state 
of the literature today, and what does it suggest about how Western assistance can 
be most constructive in the future?
We will see three themes emerge from this review of the literature. First, con-
trary to the usual focus of economics, the literature on aid and Africa has paid 
inadequate attention to the incentives faced by the public and private participants 
in aid giving and receiving. Second, the literature displays a tendency (with some 
big exceptions) for old ideas to reappear and a seeming reluctance to learn from 
failures of the old ideas. Third, one big exception to the previous theme is that the 
literature shows continuing escalation of the recommended Western involvement, 
from less aid to more aid, from sectoral projects with few conditions to structural 
adjustment loans with many conditions, from concern with economic policies to 
concern also with democracy, corruption, and ending civil war, or in general, from 
less ambitious goals to more ambitious goals for Western assistance to Africa. 
The lessons going forward from the first two themes are straightforward: pay 
attention to incentives, and reject old theories when they fail. The article will 
discuss the implication of these two lessons for the third theme: does a focus on 
incentives and learning from the past imply that the current goals of Western as-
sistance to Africa are too ambitious?  Do they imply that the West is too intrusive 
in Africa? Could foreign aid do better at some more modest tasks if it abandoned 
the more grandiose goals?
I. Africa’s Needs and Western response
The bulk of Africa’s countries rank low on standard international comparisons. 
African countries occupy most of the bottom places in income per capita, percent 
of population living in extreme poverty (less than a $1 a day), life expectancy, infant 
mortality, AIDS prevalence, literacy, and the UNDP human development index. 
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Africa is also a huge growth disappointment over the last 4 decades, with some 
of the worst growth rates in the world. (Of course, these indicators are related to 
each other conceptually and mechanically).  
The West has responded to Africa’s tragedy by intensive involvement of foreign 
aid agencies and international organizations. The average African country re-
ceives much more aid as a percent of its income than other developing countries 
and has spent more time in International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs.5 
      Of course, causality goes both ways between Western assistance and development 
outcomes in Africa. The West does more because Africa is poor, but its efforts are 
supposed to have a positive effect – to make Africa less poor. Does the still dismal 
level of the indicators today in Table 1 indicate a disappointing result of decades 
of Western assistance to Africa? A lot of the debate about the effect of Western 
assistance on Africa turns on untangling these directions of causality.
II. Theories and Evidence of the Effect of Western Assistance on Africa
The role of Western assistance in helping Africa escape poverty depends on 
one’s theory of why Africa is poor. Economists over time have postulated different 
models of poverty that have differing implications for foreign aid.
1. The Big Push Models and Foreign Aid
Big push models say that Africa is poor because it is stuck in a “poverty trap.” To 
get out of the poverty trap, they need a large aid-financed increase in investment, 
a “Big Push.” Both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth models have been 
used to discuss the mechanisms of how a poverty trap arises. 
The first mechanism is that saving is very low for people who are very close to 
subsistence (as would be predicted by a Stone-Geary utility function). In a closed 
economy, saving is equal to investment, so investment is also low. In the Harrod-
Domar model with the capital constraint binding, growth of GDP per capita is 
simply a linear function of the investment (=saving) rate minus the population 
growth rate and minus the depreciation rate. If saving is too low to keep up with 
population growth and the depreciation of capital, then per capita growth will be 
zero or negative. Early development economists in the 1950s and 1960s postulated 
a desirable per capita growth rate and calculated the “investment requirement” 
to meet this target – the distance between the low domestic saving rate and the 
“investment requirement” was called the “Financing Gap”. The role of aid was 
to fill the Financing Gap (Rostow 1960, Chenery and Strout 1966). Thus, this 
model predicted a strong growth effect for foreign aid through its role in boosting 
domestic investment above what domestic saving would finance.
Although this model soon went out of favor in the academic literature on 
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development, it stayed alive in international organizations like the World Bank 
(despite occasional attempts to kill it off, such as in Easterly 1999). Current policy 
advocates for an increase in foreign aid to Africa have cited this model explicitly 
(Devarajan et al. 2002 at the World Bank, Blair Commission on Africa 2005, 
Sachs 2005). Jeffrey Sachs even argues: “success in ending the poverty trap will 
be much easier than it appears.” He predicts that the increase in foreign aid and 
debt relief can end Africa’s poverty in our generation.
This model shows the lack of attention to incentives that has plagued the aid 
literature. Even in a closed economy, saving depends not only on the distance 
from subsistence but also on the incentive to save depending on the rate of return 
to saving and investment. In an open economy, investment is not determined by 
domestic saving, but depends on the rate of return to investment.  Private foreign 
investors and bank lenders will invest in the economy if returns are attractive 
enough.6  Domestic investors will also compare the returns to domestic and foreign 
investments, as shown by Africa’s extensive capital flight in which an estimated 
39 percent of the stock of Africans’ capital is held outside the continent (Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Patillo 2000). 
In the Solow model, a strong relationship between income and saving rates 
could generate multiple equilibria at low and high levels of capital stock, reopen-
ing the possibility of a poverty trap. Again, the low domestic saving would not 
be a problem in an open economy in which investment responds to incentives. 
Kraay and Raddatz 2005 have shown that the relationship between initial capital 
and saving must follow an S-shaped curve to generate a poverty trap; they fail to 
find evidence for this shape in the data. 
The other main mechanism to generate a poverty trap is some kind of nonconvex-
ity in the production function in the Solow model. There may be strong external 
economies to investment, or there may be high fixed costs to investment projects 
such that a minimum threshold must be passed for investment to be productive. 
This idea was part of the inspiration for the original article that first proposed a 
Big Push (Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943). This strand has had a longer shelf-life 
in the academic literature than the “Financing Gap” model because of the great 
interest of theorists in models with multiple equilibria (see for example the article 
by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989). Sachs 2005 also emphasizes such noncon-
vexities in suggesting that Africa is in a poverty trap. However, Kraay and Raddatz 
2004 also failed to find evidence for technological nonconvexities, while Easterly 
2005 failed to find evidence in general for poverty traps at low initial income.
Nevertheless, Big Push models predict strong effects of aid on investment and 
growth. This prediction has been the subject of a vast empirical literature. The 
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literature only really began to make progress when the severe problem of reverse 
causality was addressed with the use of political instrumental variables for aid flows. 
Boone 1996 was among the first to use such instruments and found zero effects 
of aid on investment and growth. Burnside and Dollar 2000 find that “aid raises 
growth in a good policy environment.” However, Easterly, Roodman, and Levine 
2003 find that applying the “new data test” i.e., adding new data unavailable to 
the original authors but keeping the same specification, the Burnside and Dollar 
finding no longer holds.
The most recent entries in this literature are Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavani 
2004 (CRB), which finds positive effects of aid on growth, and Rajan and Subra-
manian 2005, which fails to confirm the CRB finding and in general finds a zero 
effect of aid on growth.
Casual observation, such as that summarized in the following table, makes it 
clear why one has to do some convolutions to the data to get a positive effect of 
aid on growth:
CRB was quoted to support the proposal to increase aid to finance a Big Push in 
Africa (for  example, Blair Commission on Africa 2005, UN Millennium Project 
2005). However, another feature of CRB’s results contradicts the Big Push models 
– these models would predict increasing returns to aid, whereas CRB actually find 
diminishing returns to aid.  CRB found an aid-squared term to be significant and 
negative, so the marginal effect of aid on growth in CRB turns negative at aid 
receipts over 8 percent of GDP – many African countries are already above this 
threshold and virtually all will be above it after the doubling of aid to Africa (Moss 
and Subramanian 2005). CRB’s findings would actually imply there should NOT 
be the Big Push recommended by the Blair Commission and the UN Millennium 
Project. Such disjunctions between the use of research to support a proposal and 
the actual implications of the research are distressingly common in the literature 
on aid to Africa.
The aid and growth literature has suffered from the shortcomings of the cross-
country growth literature – the specification of how aid affects growth and the 
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   Percent of Time
 Per Capita  Under IMF
 Growth, Aid/GDP Programs,  
Country Category 1980-2002 (%) 1980-2002 1980-2002
Ten Worst -1.9  10.98 54%
Growth Rates
Ten Best 3.8%  0.23 4%
Growth Rates
selection of the other right-hand-side controls is pretty much wide open, and many 
of the specifications in the literature seem complex and not very transparent as to 
why they were chosen. This opens the door to data mining, which would manifest 
itself as a lack of robustness of aid and growth results. 
2. Project interventions: education, health, and infrastructure
Another view of Africa’s poverty was that it resulted from low human capital 
(poor health and education) and infrastructure. This emphasis began back in 
the 1960s but is still a major theme of explaining Africa’s poverty. This emphasis 
beginning in the 1960s led to what may have been foreign aid’s most productive 
period in Africa, when it invested in projects designed to achieve piecemeal, specific 
tasks like improving health, schooling, and infrastructure. Studies of such projects 
usually find a reasonably high rate of return, although there is the huge concern 
that these measured returns come from self-evaluation by those doing the projects 
along with not fully independent in-house.
Infant mortality is high in Africa, but has fallen significantly over the past 4 
decades (see figure). WHO vaccination campaigns, the eradication of smallpox and 
river blindness, cheap treatments like oral rehydration therapy for infant diarrhea, 
and the spread of antibiotics contributed to success.
Education is also an area where there was some success. Both primary and sec-
ondary enrollments have increased sharply over their dismal levels at independence, 
although they are still comparatively low. 
However, like the first approach to aid, the project approach to foreign aid un-
derestimated the incentive problems with aid delivery. Teachers and health workers 
must be rewarded for good performance and penalized for bad performance to 
deliver good quality service. Health and education ministries must be motivated 
to get medicines and school inputs to the citizens. The donor bureaucracies them-
selves must have the incentive to make their projects work.
These incentive problems have been a major theme of the literature on health 
and education in Africa. While enrollments have expanded rapidly, the quality of 
education is hampered by missing inputs like textbooks and other school materials, 
weak incentives for teachers, corruption in education bureaucracies, and disruption 
of schooling by political events (Filmer and Pritchett 1997). 
Likewise, in health, some of the initial progress has slowed, possibly due to cor-
ruption in the health system (studies in Guinea, Cameroon, Uganda, and Tanzania 
estimated that 30 to 70 percent of government drugs disappeared before reaching 
the patients) and the more complicated health problems that cannot be solved with 
routine methods (Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000, Pritchett and Woolcock 
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2004). More complex health emergencies, like AIDS and malaria, have proved to 
be resistant to donors’ efforts to contain them. 7 
We see similar themes in infrastructure. Since independence, there has been 
much road building and expansion of electric generating capacity and water sup-
ply, supporting the idea that aid is more productive when directed to specific, 
piecemeal interventions. However, the incentive problems appear in this sector as 
well. There has been a chronic underinvestment in maintenance of infrastructure. 
For example, donors (and the recipient governments) have the incentive to build 
highly visible new roads, but less incentive to provide invisible maintenance. 
Infrastructure is now better than it was at independence, but still deficient for 
creating private incentives to invest. 
Water supply and sanitation has been somewhat more of a success story (see 
figure), but even in that sector lack of maintenance causes boreholes to go out of 
service prematurely. I will examine to what extent, the literature provides systematic 
evidence to support the positive and negative aspects of this picture. 
The underfunding of maintenance also reflects the donors’ elusive goal of “sustain-
ability” (best summarized by the cliché about giving a man a fish vs. teaching him 
to fish).  Donors envision the local government taking over the project, which they 
think is necessary to make it last. This intuition was once appealing, but decades of 
experience show otherwise. As Kremer and Miguel (2003) argue, trying to make 
the project “sustainable” usually guarantees that it will not be “sustained.”
Despite the problems, the stylized facts are consistent with a positive effect of 
aid on the availability of health services, education, and clean water and sanitation. 
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Although the sectoral outcomes could be much better if the incentive problems 
were solved, health, education, and water and sanitation are much improved over 
their state at independence. Can we confirm more systematically that aid was suc-
cessful in fostering success in these areas? What could account for better results 
in aid in these areas than in others? There has been surprisingly little research on 
this question. I speculate that the incentives for donors could have been better 
because these were areas where success is more easily measured and where there 
is a more direct relationship between donor efforts and results (as compared to 
fostering growth, for example). As a result, donors could be held more accountable 
for results in these specific areas.
The new health emergencies of AIDS, as well as the persistence of malaria, has 
led to the call for much more extensive foreign aid to address health problems 
(World Health Organization 2001, Sachs 2005). The call is for some kind of 
crash program, with extensive top-down planning, to radically eradicate threats to 
health (another illustration of the theme of escalation of recommended aid efforts). 
These calls show little awareness of the incentive problems in health delivery (not 
to mention the incentives and information problems with top-down planning), 
and do not sufficiently appreciate the complexity of AIDS and malaria.
Despite the partial successes in expanding quantity of health, education, and 
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More good news: clean water and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa
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water and sanitation, Africa’s economic growth did not improve, which casts some 
doubt on the claim that human capital is the principal explanation for the Africa 
growth tragedy. There was little association, for example, between expanding 
education and economic growth (Pritchett 2001, Bils and Klenow 2002). Foreign 
aid donors were dissatisfied that these successes did not result in rapid growth in 
Africa. Critics argued that these inputs would not produce growth if the govern-
ment mismanaged the economy as a whole. This led to the next escalation in 
Western assistance, the advent of structural adjustment lending by the IMF and 
World Bank, beginning in 1980. 
3. Models of policies and growth
The structural adjustment programs came out of another view of why Africa 
is poor, and this gained prominence in the early 1980s with the advent of the 
“Washington consensus,” and the pro-free markets arguments of people like 
the World Bank’s chief economist, Anne Krueger. This view says that Africa is 
poor because its governments have chosen bad policies. Indeed, it seems obvious 
that many African governments pursued policies very destructive of economic 
development: artificially overvalued currencies, high black market premiums 
on foreign exchange, controls on interest rates that led to negative real interest 
rates for savers, drastic restrictions on international trade, and reliance on state 
enterprises. African observations often strengthened the results on the negative 
effects of bad policies on growth in the voluminous growth regressions literature. 
The “bad policies” view of Africa’s poverty led to a different view of the role of 
aid. The role of Western donors and international institutions in this view was to 
induce changes in policy in Africa by making aid conditional on such changes. 
The structural adjustment loans (SALs) of the IMF and the World Bank were the 
embodiment of this approach. The objective of the SALs was “adjustment with 
growth” (Corbo and Fischer 1987).
How successful were these loans in facilitating “adjustment”, i.e. changing policy? 
How successful was foreign aid in inducing better policies? The answer seems to 
be that Western donors and international institutions were not very successful in 
changing policy (Alesina and Dollar 2002, Burnside and Dollar 2000, Van de 
Walle 2001, 2005, Easterly 2005a).
How successful were the SALs in promoting growth? The growth and inflation 
outcomes associated with structural adjustment were dismal. Easterly 2005a picked 
out the African countries that were in the top 20 worldwide in the number of 
structural adjustment loans received from the World Bank and IMF. Most African 
countries that received intensive treatment from structural adjustment have nega-
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tive or zero growth and some have high inflation (see table).
On balance, the outcomes associated with frequent structural adjustment lending 
are poor negative growth or high inflation, or both. Of course, there is a selection 
problem in that countries that are already in trouble were the ones that were chosen 
to receive these loans. However, it is hard to believe in a positive effect of structural 
adjustment lending despite the selection problem, for three reasons. First, things 
were so bad in so many recipients of structural adjustment that it stretches belief 
that it had a strong POSITIVE effect. Second, since structural adjustment loans 
were repeated year after year, one wonders why the patient did not improve after 
repeated doses of the medicine. Finally, formal statistical methods to control for 
possible reverse causality from crises to treatment still finds that structural adjust-
ment lending had a zero or negative effect on economic growth (Easterly 2005a). 
Another influential recent study (Przeworski and Vreeland 2001) still finds that 
the effect of IMF programs on growth is negative, even controlling for the adverse 
selection effect. Another piece of evidence: African countries (even the “success 
stories” of Ghana and Uganda) couldn’t pay back zero-interest Structural Adjust-
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Niger 14 -2.30%   2%  
Zambia 18 -2.10% 58%
Madagascar 17 -1.80% 17%
Togo 15 -1.60% 5%
Cote d’Ivoire 26 -1.40% 6%
Malawi 18 -0.20% 23%
Mali 15 -0.10% 4%
Mauritania 16 0.10% 7%
Senegal 21 0.10% 5%
Kenya 19 0.10% 14%
Ghana 26 1.20% 32%
Uganda 20 2.30% 50%
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ment Loans, and the World Bank and IMF had to forgive the debts through the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. 
This dismal experience led to further rethinking of how aid could raise growth, 
even if it were unsuccessful at changing policy. A hugely influential study by World 
Bank economists Craig Burnside and David Dollar found that aid does raise 
growth in a good policy environment, although they also confirmed that aid had 
no effect on inducing good policies.8 This suggested a different role for donors 
– they should not try to change policy, but they should be selective in choosing 
aid recipients, directing most aid to countries that had already achieved good 
economic policies on their own. Although Burnside and Dollar did not produce 
a model, they seemed to have in mind models that produce growth effects of aid, 
like those in the first section, with the welcome addition of policies that affect the 
incentive to invest the aid proceeds. 
  Burnside and Dollar did a growth regression on aid, with an additional inter-
action term between aid and good policy (measured by a composite index of low 
budget deficits, low inflation, and free trade). Their sample consists of six four-
year time periods running from 1970-73 to 1990-93. In many of their tests, they 
found that when a country both got more foreign aid and had good policy, growth 
went up. They summarized (p. 847): “We find that aid has a positive impact on 
growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but 
has little effect in the presence of poor policies.” 
The paper brought back the hope that aid could raise economic growth, which 
fed a policy recommendation to increase foreign aid, if only policies were good. 
President George W. Bush soon after announced a $5 billion increase in U.S. for-
eign assistance, about a 50 percent increase, and designed the increase to reward 
“good policy” countries.9  
Unfortunately, the Burnside and Dollar study suffered from that curse of 
growth regression results, a lack of robustness and replicability.  Easterly, Levine, 
and Roodman 2004 used the exact same techniques and specification as Burnside 
and Dollar, but added more data that became available since Burnside and Dollar 
did their study.  They also hunted for more data in their original sample period 
(1970-93). Using updated and additional data, they did the same statistical exer-
cise with four-year averages with the same control variables including terms for 
aid/GDP and the Burnside-Dollar policy index. They found no evidence in the 
expanded sample including new data that aid raised growth amongst countries 
with good policies, indicating a lack of support for the conclusion that “aid works 
in a good policy environment.” A subsequent study by Rajan and Subramanian 
2005 has also failed to confirm the Burnside and Dollar results. We are back to 
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the pessimistic conclusion of the first section that there is no evidence that aid has 
effects on economic growth.
There were also other doubts about the policy and growth models in retrospect. 
Although policy changes were unrelated to aid intensity or to structural adjustment 
lending, there was a time trend towards better macroeconomic policies in Africa (as 
well as in all developing countries). African governments, with a few exceptions, 
moved away in the 1990s from extreme exchange rate overvaluations, extremely 
high premiums on foreign exchange in the black market, negative real interest 
rates, and high inflation (although there is no cross-country correlation with aid 
intensity, it may be that the donors contributed to the international climate of 
opinion among policy makers that contributed to these changes).  Yet the growth 
response to policy reform was disappointing (Rodrik 2000, Easterly 2001b). 
Separately, a new body of research suggested that bad macroeconomic policies 
may have only been a symptom of poor institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 
and Thaicharoen 2002). Other research suggests that what looks like bad policy in 
Africa could be an optimal response to the local constraints – such as the inability 
to collect taxes from anyone who does not use the financial sector (Gordon and Li 
2005).  Supporting this view, studies that controlled for both policies and institu-
tions’ effect on development found strong effects of high quality institutions, but 
no additional effect of good policies like trade openness and low inflation (Rodrik, 
Subramananian, and Trebbi 2002, Easterly and Levine 2003).
Somewhat independently, aid donors and the International Financial Institu-
tions were paying increased attention in the 1990s to institutional features like 
corruption, democracy, property rights, political violence, and regulation. These 
concerns became obvious as a number of African states became “failed states,” 
whose problems it was difficult to argue stemmed just from poor economic policy 
choices.  This led to yet a further escalation of donor involvement in Africa – the 
attempt to induce “good governance.”
4. Aid,  institutions, and development
A large literature on institutions and development suggests that Africa is poor 
because it has poor institutions – lack of property rights, dictatorship, weak courts 
and contract enforcement, political instability and violence, a hostile regulatory 
environment for private business, and high corruption. This view draws upon the 
seminal work of Douglass North and the vast literature he spawned. In order to end 
African poverty, in this view, the West needed to promote good institutions.
Ironically, one of the principal recent papers arguing for the institutions view of 
poverty argues that Africa’s bad institutions are partly the result of the West’s earlier 
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intrusions in Africa. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (AJR) in a series of papers 
argue that colonization in Africa was unusually exploitative because the mortality 
rate facing Europeans was so high. Europeans wanted to get rich quick and get out 
of the “White Man’s Grave,” according to this theory. The Belgian Congo is well 
known as an extreme case of exploitation. According to AJR, the new independent 
states of Africa took over the extractive institutions out of the rulers’ self-interest, 
with Congo/Zaire being again the classic example under Mobutu. 
The AJR findings are otherwise debated in the literature, with serious questions 
about the quality of the data on European settler mortality rates (Albouy 2004), 
alternative explanations such as the high human capital of European settlers 
(Glaeser et al. 2004), and on the validity of the identification strategy.  Another 
question mark about the “extractive colonialism” hypothesis is that historians of 
colonialism in Africa have generally not found evidence of large colonial profits 
for the metropoles (Dormois and Crouzet 1998, Fieldhouse 1982, O’Brien and 
Prados de las Escosura 1999).  However, other authors have also found a strong 
effect of institutions on development due to factors other than settler mortality, 
such as distance from the equator, crop endowments, and ethnic fractionalization 
(Mauro 1995, Hall and Jones 1999, Easterly and Levine 2003, Rodrik, Subrama-
nian, and Trebbi 2002).
These arguments could imply a rather pessimistic conclusion for aid donors 
– if institutions are determined by deep geographic, ecological, and historical 
factors, then what could aid do to help?  This is partly a misunderstanding about 
what such results mean for policy. The factors like distance from the equator and 
crop endowments were chosen to identify the exogenous variation in institutions 
that could be used to draw causal inferences. They do not say that institutions are 
determined ONLY by exogenous factors, and hence do not imply anything about 
whether aid donors can influence institutions. 
However, the concern is still valid that institutions could depend mainly on 
exogenous historical and geographic factors and not on anything aid donors can 
affect.  Alesina et al. (2005) find that arbitrary colonial boundaries contributed to 
African institutions being worse than those in other continents. Mamdani 2000 
and Iliffe 2004 argues that colonial practices of indirect rule worsened despotism 
in Africa. Nunn (2004) finds that the slave trade contributed to poor institutions 
in Africa. The “large natural resource curse” literature stresses the negative effect of 
oil and minerals (with which Africa is well-endowed) on institutions. Jensen and 
Wantchekon 2005 documented systematically the association of resource wealth 
with autocracy in Africa.10 Jensen and Wantchekon show that new democracies 
have succeeded in Africa mainly in resource-poor places like Benin, Mali, and 
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Madagascar, while oil-rich states like Gabon and Cameroon still have the same 
dictators that have been in power for decades.
It is of interest, therefore, to examine the literature about aid and institutions, 
to see whether donors can still influence institutions at the margin. Three ques-
tions have received some attention. First, do donors give more to poor countries 
who have better institutions (e.g. more democracy, less corruption)?  Second, does 
aid induce better or worse institutions? Third, how would outsiders engineer a 
transition from the present state of informal institutions towards more formal 
institutions?
The first question is relevant because donors widely assumed that aid would 
work better in countries with better institutions. The answer to the first question 
also affects the answer to the second. If donors give more aid to countries with 
better institutions, that would create some incentive for reformers in the recipient 
country to adapt better institutions. There is a large literature of “selectivity” of 
aid donors with respect to institutions.  Alesina and Weder 2002 and Alesina and 
Dollar 2000 find no evidence that democracies or less corrupt states are rewarded 
with more aid. 
This result reflects some of the egregious behavior of donors towards corrupt 
dictators, such as the $20 billion that donors gave to Mobutu in Zaire during 
his reign. These episodes are sometimes dismissed as a Cold War aberration. Has 
there been progress over time in “selectivity,” since corruption and democracy are 
relatively new concerns for donors? In 1996 (the first year that data is available), 
there was no association between how much aid per capita a developing country 
received and its rating on the World Bank measure of corruption (controlling for 
other determinants of aid per capita, like per capita income and population size). 
Six years later in 2002, after much more public emphasis on corruption by donors, 
there was still no association between aid given to a country and how corrupt it 
was. Similarly, there was no association between aid given to a country and how 
democratic it was, either in 1996 or 2002, controlling for per capita income and 
population size, despite escalating rhetoric about democracy by donors. 
The lack of a positive incentive from aid “selectivity” is a problem, because there 
are theoretical predictions that aid could also have negative effect on institutions. It 
may enable autocrats to perpetuate their hold on power, make rulers accountable 
to foreign donors rather than their own citizens.  High aid revenues going to the 
national government benefit political insiders, often corrupt insiders, who have 
the incentive to oppose democracy that would lead to more equal distribution of 
aid. Aid increases the return to rent-seeking, which undermines many institutions 
(property rights, government efficiency, honoring contracts, etc.) Just as there is a 
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“natural resource curse,” there could be an “aid curse,” for much the same reasons. 
Indeed, systematic evidence in several recent studies suggests that aid actually 
increases corruption, decreases democracy, and makes government worse. 
Indeed, Svensson (2000) finds that aid increases corruption in ethnically frac-
tionalized countries (which would mean most African countries). Knack (2005) 
finds that higher aid worsens bureaucratic quality, leads to violating the law with 
more impunity, and more corruption (controlling for potential reverse causality). 
Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2005) similarly find that high aid caused 
setbacks to democracy over 1960-1999. They found aid’s effect on democracy to 
be worse than that of the “natural resource curse.” 
Then there is the thorny question about how aid would practically go about 
changing institutions for the better in Africa. Without strong formal institutions, 
many market transactions create opportunities for opportunistic behavior such as 
non-delivery after payment, non-payment after delivery, “hold-ups” during some 
point in a transaction, defaulting on loans, failing to pay wages or pensions, and 
stealing from the enterprise or shirking labor. The research of Marcel Fafchamps 
(2001, 2004) has highlighted the dependence of African markets on self-enforc-
ing networks of merchants to resolve problems of opportunistic behavior, with a 
counterpart theoretical literature such as Greif (1993) and Dixit (2004). The basic 
idea is that networks can permanently expel any member engaged in opportunis-
tic behavior, creating a strong incentive not to cheat. In Africa, many networks 
form along ethnic lines, such as fish trading among the Luo in Kenya, retail trade 
among the Gurage of Ethiopia, long distance trade by the Hausa of Nigeria, and 
the domination of the formal business sector by Lebanese in West Africa, Indians 
in East Africa, and Europeans in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
The transition from informal to formal institutions is complicated. Attempts 
by Western aid agencies to introduce top-down formal institutions have not fared 
well in the complex maze of bottom up arrangements. Dixit (2004) has an interest-
ing argument as to how introduction of imperfect rules-based institutions could 
actually make things worse, as they create outside opportunities for members of 
relationship-based networks. Network members can cheat their partners and then 
exit to operate in the rules-based system. A society could get caught in between 
informal and formal institutions, with neither working well.  
There are similar doubts about introducing even such straightforward reforms 
as private ownership of land. The anthropologist Parker Shipton (1988) looked at 
the consequences of formal land titling for the Luo tribe in western Kenya in the 
early 1980s. He found that formal titles induced more uncertainty about property 
rights, since those with paper titles just added to the list of possible claimants 
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under customary and formal laws. Ensminger (1992) finds similar results among 
the Orma of Kenya, and Berry (2001) among the Asante of Ghana. Goldstein and 
Udry 2004 find the land rights situation in Ghana to be so ambiguous – despite 
the existence of formal titling and land sales -- that women farmers do not leave 
land fallow (as would be optimal for land fertility) for fear of losing their rights 
to cultivate the land.  Having two sets of rules is worse than having one. The 
transition from custom to well-functioning formal institutions is something that 
aid donors have to consider instead of just recommending some ideal norms for 
good institutions. The macro research findings on how “good property rights cause 
development” thus turns out to be complex to implement in practice. 
Likewise, the idea of outside donors forcing democracy on countries is rather 
problematic. It is not obvious that non-democratic outside coercion is the optimal 
way to foster democratic practices. Fortunately, there has been an expansion of 
democracy in Africa which as we have seen cannot be attributed to aid and so 
does look like it is homegrown. This provides some hope for the process of local 
development of good institutions.
To close this section, I will note how in some aid recipients in Africa, institutional 
outcomes were particularly disastrous – civil war, genocide, anarchy, and “failed 
states.” The IMF and aid donors were intensively involved in these countries before 
the collapse, but I will not attempt to solve the intractable analytical problem of 
how much the donors contributed (or mitigated?) the breakdown of the state. 
I will just note in passing how the theme of escalation of aid efforts has recently 
gotten even more extreme. Now, some economists and other social scientists 
are suggesting ever more intrusive interventions in these failures, taking over 
sovereign powers of local governments – with economic incentives to end civil 
wars, international military peacekeeping forces, “post-conflict reconstruction,” 
“neo-trusteeships,” or “shared sovereignty.” Economists have now created a large 
literature on the causes of civil war, studying “greed” vs. “grievance” as causes of 
civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Finding “greed” to be the dominant fac-
tor, the authors discuss how aid donors can manipulate financial incentives for 
combatants and how foreign actors can stabilize the situation after the civil war 
ends with some role in government. Taking a further step, political scientists 
James Fearon and David Laitin of Stanford wrote in Spring 2004: “the current, 
ad hoc and underrationalized arrangements ought to be reformed in the direction 
of neotrusteeship.” In a similar vein, political scientist Stephen Krasner (also of 
Stanford) wrote in Fall 2004: 
Left to their own devices, collapsed and badly 
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governed states will not fix themselves because they 
have limited administrative capacity, not least with 
regard to maintaining internal security. … To reduce 
international threats and improve the prospects for 
individuals in such polities, alternative institutional 
arrangements supported by external actors, such as 
de facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty, should 
be added to the list of policy options. …De facto 
trusteeships, and especially shared sovereignty, would 
offer political leaders a better chance of bringing peace 
and prosperity to the populations of badly governed 
states.
There is nothing a priori to rule out that citizens of some African nations could 
prefer international administration to local corrupt autocrats or warlords. How-
ever, international peacekeepers do not have a great track record (see Rieff 2002), 
and it is surprising how confidently the aid policymakers use this new literature 
to make simplistic recommendations in very complex circumstances. The World 
Bank suggested in a 2003 report on how to end civil wars and restore peace.
Countries can break this conflict trap by putting 
in place the policies and institutions necessary for 
sustained growth. Our new understanding of the 
causes and consequences of civil wars provides 
a compelling basis for international action. …
Increased {foreign} aid and changes in allocation 
and administration could make such assistance 
more effective in preventing conflict… International 
action … could avert untold suffering, spur poverty 
reduction, and help to protect people around the 
world from … drug-trafficking, disease, and terrorism.
The report suggests that international military peacekeeping forces, reforms, and 
foreign aid can be half the risk of civil war in poor economies from 44 percent 
to 22 percent.11 
I will not review the literature on civil wars, peacekeeping, and “neotrustee-
ships” in any detail. I just note this literature to show the extreme end-point at 
which one important strand of the aid literature has arrived after escalating the 
recommended intervention in African societies ever since independence (ironi-
cally ending at something resembling the pre-independence colonial regime). The 
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failure of previous Western interventions in Africa is used as the rationale for even 
more intensive intervention.
5. Dysfunctional donors
All the attention in the aid and Africa debate is focused on Africa. But how effec-
tive were the donors in delivering valuable services to Africa? We have already seen 
some alarming signs of donor dysfunction. There are many more. Donors spent 
$2 billion over the last 20 years on roads in Tanzania. The roads did not improve.
The principal output has been aid bureaucracy, with the Tanzanians producing 
2,400 reports a year for the 1,000 donor missions who visit each year. 
Democratically accountable bureaucracies are somewhat better at fixing the 
roads. When I lived in Takoma Park, Maryland, I called Kathy Porter, my city 
council-woman, to say that I had a pot-hole outside my house. Takoma Park 
Public Works came the next day and fixed the pothole, end of story. Things do 
not always work this well, but casual observation suggests roads in America are 
in vastly better condition than roads in Africa. Here’s how a poor person in Tan-
zania would get a pothole fixed with the aid agencies, to give a very abbreviated 
version of the actual process. The national government solicits a “poverty reduc-
tion support credit” (PRSC) from the World Bank. To get a loan from the World 
Bank, the government must complete a satisfactory poverty reduction strategy 
paper (PRSP). The World Bank follows a series of internal steps to approve a 
PRSC, including the preparation of a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). If the 
international lenders and donors approve the PRSP and release new funds to the 
national government, then government will allocate the money in accordance 
with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). If the pothole is still 
not fixed despite the PRSC, PRSP, CAS, and MTEF, and the poor person wants 
to complain, he is understandably at a loss –- nobody is individually responsible 
and accountable for fixing a pothole. 
Even by bureaucratic standards, foreign aid bureaucracy is worse. Why? Perhaps 
it is because efforts and results in aid are largely unobservable, seen only by the 
voiceless poor. The lack of visibility on results makes aid bureaucracies unac-
countable.  Unlike private firms or democratic governments in rich countries, aid 
agencies do not face a “market test” or a “voter test”. Africa’s poor are political 
orphans: they have no voice or feedback on whether aid is helping them, and 
nobody is accountable to them.
III. The Micro Literature on Evaluation of Specific Interventions
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The micro literature on development interventions adopts a completely differ-
ent mind-set on aid to Africa from the “West saving Africa” paradigm. Eschewing 
these sweeping visions, this literature just seeks to evaluate the effect of some very 
specific interventions. The recent boom in the development literature on random-
ized controlled trials to evaluate development interventions suggests that some 
piecemeal interventions can do some good. 
The Dutch aid organization International Christian Support Fund (ICS) dis-
tributed deworming drugs to schoolchildren in southern Busia district, Kenya. 
92 percent of children were infected with intestinal worms that cause listlessness, 
malnutrition, and pain. Kremer and Miguel 2001 used a randomized approach 
in assessing the effects of deworming drugs. They studied the ICS programs that 
administered drugs and did worm prevention education for schools in Busia, 
Kenya. The project phased in the programs over three years, so there were three 
groups. In the first phase, Phase I schools could be compared to Phase II and III 
schools. In the second phase, Phase I and II schools could be compared to Phase 
III schools. They were able to identify a positive effect of deworming drugs on 
school attendance and a zero effect of deworming education on worm infection 
rates. The deworming drugs decreased school absenteeism by a quarter. 
Banerjee and He 2004 gives other helpful examples that have been verified by 
randomized controlled trials as cost-effective uses of foreign aid: cash for education 
programs, de-worming drugs, dietary supplements like those for iron, Vitamin A, 
and iodine, education in using condoms and treating other sexually transmitted 
diseases to slow the spread of AIDS, indoor spraying to control malaria, fertil-
izer subsidies, vaccination, and urban water provision. None of these are keys to 
development according to some grand scheme; they are just modest interventions 
that make people’s lives better. 
IV. Conclusions
This review of the literature does not give a lot of grounds for hope that the 
West can save Africa. Either the various views of the roots of poverty in Africa 
were too simplistic, or the attempts to change these root causes underestimated 
the difficulty of doing so from the outside, or both. 
The failure of the West’s attempted rescue does not necessarily imply a disastrous 
outlook for Africa.  Although beyond the scope of this review, I see no reason to 
dismiss the hope that Africans on their own will achieve economic and political 
changes that promote African economic development, and some of these changes 
are already happening (such as the movement towards freer markets and the expan-
sion of democracy).  There are hopeful signs of the growth of enterprise in Africa, 
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such as the explosion of cell phones.
There are homegrown initiatives like Ashesi University in Accra, Ghana, “the 
Swarthmore of Ghana” which offers scholarships to half the entering class, started by 
a Ghanaian returning expatriate (although official aid agencies declined to support 
it).  Programs to recruit and train the local people who are intended beneficiaries 
of aid, as well as local NGOs, to do evaluation and give feedback to government 
and aid agencies, to be “aid watchers” (a program like this in Benin is being started 
by NYU professor Leonard Wantchekon). In the end, economic development in 
Africa depends on African private sector entrepreneurs, African civic activists, and 
African political reformers . . . not on what ineffective, bureaucratic, unaccount-
able, and poorly informed and motivated outsiders do.
So what should Western aid do for Africa, if anything? Just because the West 
cannot save Africa does not logically imply that there is nothing the rich countries 
can do for Africans. The evidence in this review suggests that aid has been more 
successful at delivering tangible outcomes like education, health, and water. The 
micro development literature using randomized controlled trials also finds positive 
effects of some specific development interventions. 
A more modest set of goals for foreign aid in Africa would make it easier (al-
though not exactly easy) to hold aid agencies accountable for results. The sweeping 
ambitions of the current Western aid efforts in Africa do not lend themselves to 
accountability, since the outcomes depends on many other factors besides aid agency 
effort and attempts to isolate the effects of that effort have proved fruitless. More 
accountable aid agencies might be motivated to make more progress on some of 
the incentive problems of even the piecemeal interventions.
The more modest goals would also make the West much less intrusive in Africa, 
ending the historical tendency towards ever-increasing escalation of Western in-
tervention in Africa. This seems like a good thing for many reasons. The intrusive 
Western role made African governments accountable to external actors instead 
of to their own citizens. Africans, like people everywhere, resent coercive foreign 
intervention. Insiders usually have better information and incentives to solve 
their own problems than outsiders do. Arguably, local democracy that facilitates 
citizen feedback has proven to be a more effective vehicle for good government 
than outside pressure. Finally, the more intrusive large-scale interventions have 
lots of unintended consequences that are hard to evaluate, many of which could 
be negative. 
In short, the West cannot “save Africa,” but rich country aid can still do good 
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things in a piecemeal way to alleviate the suffering of some desperately poor 
people.
As F. A. Hayek wrote in his classic critique of expert-driven planning, “the suc-
cess of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can pos-
sibly know.” Hayek suggested “the curious task of economics is to demonstrate 
to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.” 12 
The escalation of Western interventions in Africa shows an arrogance in the face 
of very imperfect knowledge.
Once economists discard arrogance, there is hope to hold donors accountable 
for such piecemeal outcomes as well-maintained roads, water supply, medicines, 
nutritional supplements, and textbooks, to improve the well-being of the poorest 
people in the world. 
It is time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid! It’s up to people who care 
about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for results. Foreign aid should 
go towards figuring out what works to help poor people with their most desper-
ate needs, need independent evaluation and transparency. So that the next $568 
billion of foreign aid to Africa does get 12-cent medicine to keep sick children 
dying from malaria, does get $4 bed nets to Africans to prevent malaria, does get 
the $3 per new mother that would prevent millions of child deaths, so that the 
next $568 billion of foreign aid to Africa does reach the poor.
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Footnotes
1 Following a very common convention, this paper means sub-Saharan Africa whenever it uses 
the name “Africa.” 
2 International Herald Tribune, Friday January 28, 2005, p. 1
3 http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/hunger_map/map/hungermap_popup/index.swf
4 As described by Richard Rotberg (2002)
5 Source: World Development Indicators of World Bank for aid and IMF for time in its pro-
grams. I use 1976 as the starting point because the last African colonies became independent 
in 1975.
6 The development economists of the 50s and 60s can be excused for neglecting this possibility 
given the underdeveloped international capital market of that era. There is much less excuse 
today, when many African countries had access to international capital markets beginning in 
the 1980s, and when the current lack of access is arguably more a function of the investment 
climate than any market imperfection.  
7 Jeffrey Sachs and co-authors has argued that Africa’s health is particularly disfavored by an 
ecology favorable to the most lethal kind of malaria. Skeptics wonder why donors and govern-
ments cannot respond by adopting fairly low-cost treatment and prevention of malaria. The 
colonial authorities controlled malaria successfully controlled in some places and periods. 
Utzinger, Tozan, and Singer 2001 discuss successful malaria control in the Zambian cop-
per mining belt during the colonial period. Caldas de Castro et al. 2004 discuss a successful 
program to control malaria in Dar es Salaam before World War I.  
8  Burnside and Dollar (2000)
9  Another factor in the administration decision was the personal lobbying by the rock star Bono, 
who seems to be the most influential figure in the aid policy community.
10  See also Ross, 2001. Another study confirming this result is Collier and Hoeffler, 2005
11 World Bank, 2003, p. 168
12  p. 76, Hayek 1988
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